Economic Analysis of Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in Beef Systems in Argentina and Uruguay by Thor, Eric, III et al.
 
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 
Volume 10, Issue 3, 2007 
 
Economic Analysis of Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in 
Beef Systems in Argentina and Uruguay 
 
Eric Thor, III a,  DeeVon Bailey bL, Alejandro R. Silva c, and Steven S. Vickner d
 
a Former Graduate Student, Royal Agricultural College and  
Utah State University, 13641 S. 33rd Street, Phoenix, AZ, 85044, USA 
b Professor and Interim Head, Department of Economics,  
Utah State University 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT, 84322-3530, USA 
c Director Professor, Agroindustrial Economics & Management, School of Agronomy 
    University of Buenos Aires,  Avda. San Martín 4453, C1417DSE – Buenos Aires, Argentina 
d Associate Professor, Department of Economics,  






The European Union’s (EU) ban of hormone-treated beef products in 1989 has virtually 
eliminated beef exports to the EU from countries where cattle are routinely implanted 
with growth hormones.  This study examined whether or not foreign direct investment 
in beef systems in Argentina and Uruguay would provide a profitable method for 
investors who want to export beef to the EU.  The results indicate that while 
investment in these systems is potentially profitable, government interventions 
designed to keep domestic beef prices low inject considerable risk into the investment 
decision. 
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The European Union’s (EU) ban of hormone-treated beef products in 1989 has virtually 
eliminated beef exports to the EU from countries, such as the United States (US) and 
Canada, where cattle are routinely implanted with growth hormones.  The elimination 
of beef imports from locations such as North America at the same time that European 
beef production and exports have been declining in the aftermath of the European BSE 
crisis in the mid 1990s and the major foot-and-mouth (FMD) outbreak in the United 
Kingdom (UK) in 2001, has led to a relatively dramatic increase in beef imports into the 
EU from South America; especially from Argentina and Uruguay.   
 
The EU became a net importer of beef in 2003 and interest is growing in places like the 
US for gaining access to the large EU beef market (USDA, FAS, 2005). Using hormone 
implants is illegal in Argentina and Uruguay and both countries have also established 
or are establishing traceability systems.  Consequently, Argentine and Uruguayan beef 
meets the specifications demanded by the EU.  This raises the question of whether or 
not foreign direct investment (FDI) in beef systems in countries like Argentina and 
Uruguay, which can export more freely to the EU than can the countries of North 
America, would provide profitable access to the EU beef market.   
 
One objective of this research was to examine the potential profitability of FDI in the 
beef systems of Uruguay and Argentina.  While prices and costs can be used to obtain a 
point estimate of profitability for FDI in these countries, significant market risk also 
exists as a result of government policies affecting cattle and beef prices, especially in 
Argentina.  Also, animal disease outbreaks, such as FMD, can affect the ability to 
export beef from both of these countries.  Consequently, a second objective was to assess 
the risk to FDI that has resulted from the impact of government policies and FMD 
outbreaks.  This research examines events which have lead to the cessation or the 
reduction of beef exports from Argentina and Uruguay and which have thus increased 
the risk associated with FDI.  These events include both the effects of government 




We are unaware of publicly available published research studies which directly address 
the issue of FDI in the beef systems of Argentina and Uruguay for the purpose of 
exporting beef to the EU.  However, a sizeable literature exists dealing with issues that 
would affect FDI decisions in the beef systems of these two countries.  The following 
discussion attempts to place the current discussion and analysis into context with the 
most relevant portion of the literature addressing the issues that could affect the FDI 
decision. 
 
The EU’s trade ban on hormone-treated beef is one of the most contentious trade issues 
between the EU and the US (Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2004; Charlier and Rainelli, 2002).  
The EU represents one of the largest beef markets in the world with domestic 
production and consumption in the EU-25 countries totaling over 7.8 million and 8.2 
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metric tones (MT) per year, respectively (USDA, FAS, 2006).
 1  EU beef production and 
exports have declined since 1990 in the aftermath of their BSE and FMD crises and 
imports have trended upward.  It is reported that EU imports of beef will reach 1 
million MT within the next decade (Robertson, 2007).
2    Consequently, there are huge 
incentives for beef exporters to try to be involved in exporting beef to the EU.  
  
US beef exporters are generally uncompetitive if they are forced to meet EU 
requirements relating to assurances and/or certifications that American beef has not 
been treated with hormones (Clemens and Babcock, 2002).  Consequently, eliminating 
or reducing the EU’s ban is a top priority for the US.  This explains why there has been 
continued pressure on the EU by the US to eliminate the export ban.  However, the EU 
has continued to maintain the ban even though the World Trade Organization has 
ruled in favor of the US in this matter (e.g., Hill, 2001; Taylor, Walsh, and Lee, 2003; 
Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2004; and Charlier and Rainelli, 2002). 
   
Considerable research has been done examining EU consumer attitudes regarding the 
ban on hormone-treated beef with most of the results concluding that European 
consumers prefer non-hormone treated beef (e.g., Lusk, Roosen, and Fox, 2003; Alfnes 
and Rickertsen, 2004; Alfnes, 2004).  This suggests that there is political support within 
the EU for maintaining the ban.  Possible solutions such as labeling imported beef as 
being hormone-treated have also not been acceptable to either side even though 
European consumers prefer mandatory labeling for hormone-treated food products 
(Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2004; Chakraborty, 2005). 
 
The impasse relating to hormone-treated beef imports into the EU at a time when the 
market for imported beef into the EU is trending upward is a significant concern for US 
beef exporters (USDA, FAS, 2005).  All of these factors including political support for 
the ban in the EU, resistance to labeling products as being hormone-treated, and the 
growth in the EU beef import market suggest that strong incentives exist for beef 
exporters in North America to find alternative methods for exporting beef to the EU.  
  
One alternative might be for beef producers from North America or elsewhere to simply 
invest directly in beef systems in countries that are free to export to the EU, such as 
Argentina and Uruguay.  Both Argentina and Uruguay have been increasing their beef 
exports since 2000 with much of this increase going to the EU especially to fill their so-
called “Hilton” Quota (Boland, Perez, and Fox, 2007) (Figure 1).  Reasons for increased 
exports from Argentina and Uruguay include the efforts by these countries to eliminate 
FMD (Ekboir et al., 2002) and world demand and supply conditions (Steiger, 2006) 
3.   
These two countries, together with Brazil, are expected to continue to capture market 
share in the international trade of beef (Steiger, 2006).  
 
                                                             
1 By contrast, US beef production is typically in the neighborhood of 11.5 – 11.8 million MT annually. 
2 By contrast, US beef exports to Japan at their peak were in the neighborhood of 600,000 MT annually. 
3  Boland, Perez, and Fox (2007) report that Uruguay was declared FMD free in 1995. 
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Although market conditions appear favorable for increasing exports from these 
countries, political issues and animal disease outbreaks may affect the ability of these 
























































Figure 1:  Beef and Veal Exports from Argentina and Uruguay, 1990-2007 project. 
 
 
government policies are often designed to keep domestic beef prices low (Steiger, 2006; 
Thor, 2006).  Work by Argentina and Uruguay to eliminate FMD has also contributed 
to export growth, but the re-emergence of FMD could eliminate or greatly reduce these 
markets (Boland, Perez, and Fox, 2007; Thor, 2006; Ekboir et al., 2002).  Consequently, 
exogenous political risks and animal disease risks exist in these markets and should be 
examined when considering the possibility of investing in these markets. 
 
Some large American food companies have had investments in the food industry of 
Argentina for sometime including investment in some of Argentina’s largest food 
companies.  Much of the American FDI in the food industry of Argentina is invested in 
food industries other than beef (USDA, ERS, 1998a).  American investments in 
Argentina’s food industry totaled slightly over $1 billion in 1996.  The total stock of 
American FDI for all industries in Uruguay in 2004 was reported by the Department of 
State to be $533 million (U. S. Department of State, 2005) and was approximately $11 
billion in Argentina in 2003 (U. S. Trade Representative, 2005).   
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There appears to have been limited American FDI in the past in the beef marketing 
chains in Argentina and Uruguay upstream from actual food products.  One notable 
exception to this is the recent joint venture between Tyson, Cactus Feeders, and Cresud 
in Argentina which is designed to provide grain-fed beef into domestic and export 
markets.  Understanding the limiting factors relating to FDI in beef systems in 
Argentina and Uruguay should be helpful to potential investors considering the 
possibility of investing in beef systems in South America as a means for accessing the 
EU market.  It is also important for researchers and academics to understand the 
incentives, risks, and barriers to FDI in these markets as total international beef trade 
increases and as the market share of world beef exports for Argentina and Uruguay 
continues to increase.  This paper attempts to address some of these issues by 
examining profitability at different levels of the cattle marketing chain in Argentina 




Personal interviews were conducted in Argentina and Uruguay during the week of June 
9, 2006 with industry participants from all levels of the marketing channel (e.g., 
producers, feedlot operators, and meat processors) as well as university researchers in 
both countries.  Dr. Alejandro Reca of Rabobank International in New York City 
introduced the interviewers to Dr. Alejandro Silva of the Universidad de Buenos Aires.  
The interviews were then organized by Dr. Silva with additional help in setting up 
interviews being provided by Dr. Carlos Mezquita Benitez of the Universidad de la 
Republica, Uruguay and Dr. DeeVon Bailey of the Utah State University, USA.
4    
   
 The purpose of these interviews was to familiarize the researchers with the economic 
environment relating to the beef systems of both countries that might contribute to 
their competitive advantage in international beef trade.  The interviews also attempted 
to identify government policies and market events that might influence cattle and beef 
prices and thus contribute to risks associated with FDI. The interviews were 
undertaken in Buenos Aires and Villa Mercedes, Argentina and Montevideo, Uruguay.  
No set questionnaire was used during these interviews which were conducted by the 
researchers. 
 
In summary, the interviews provided the blueprint for the analysis conducted in this 
research.  From the interviews a basis for understanding the challenges and 
opportunities facing the beef industry in these two countries was established.  This led 
to the selection of methodology and data used to conduct the research.  The 
methodology included a detailed budgeting analysis of profitability at the different 
levels of the marketing chain to identify potentially profitably points in the chain for 
FDI.  Also, because the interviews suggested that considerable price risk exists in 
Argentina and Uruguay as a result of government interventions and FMD outbreaks, 
an econometric analysis was conducted to quantify the potential risks associated with 
                                                             
4  Additional detail about who was interviewed and how the interviews were set up and conducted is available in Thor 
(2006). 
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these events (i.e., government intervention and FMD).  A further discussion of the 
selection of methodology and a description of the data used to conduct this analysis is 
provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
The interviews consisted essentially of the same questions about the market 
environment for the appropriate level of the marketing channel, sources of market 
information, government policies affecting cattle and beef prices, and other risks 
associated with the cattle and beef business such as animal disease outbreaks.  
Interview responses were recorded in written form by the researchers and were then 
distilled by the researchers to identify the main conclusions that could be drawn from 
the interviews.  These conclusions used to develop a general overview of the competitive 
advantage of the beef industries in both countries and also the principal government 
policies and other events during the previous 10 years that had had major effects on the 
beef industry in the two countries.  These policies and events were then incorporated 
into the price analyses used in this research to determine how they contributed to risks 
associated with FDI during the study period. 
   
The interviews revealed that one of the principal difficulties associated with conducting 
this type of research in Argentina and Uruguay was the unavailability of publicly 
available data for costs and returns in the beef and cattle industry.  Through the 
interviews we discovered that information for gross margins for different segments of 
the Argentine cattle industry is published monthly in a magazine called Margenes 
Agropecuarios Magazine (various 1996-2006).  These estimates are reported in this 
study for cow/calf operations, grass fattening operations, and feedlot operations on a 
monthly basis between January 1995 and October 2006.  These data provide some idea 
of the profitability existing at different stages of the beef marketing chain in Argentina 
and to a large degree also likely reflect conditions in Uruguay. 
Although a complete set of publicly available time series data for all costs and returns 
in the beef systems of Argentina and Uruguay was not available, the interviews 
established that monthly average cattle prices were available from the Liniers Market 
in Buenos Aires and the INAC (Instituto Nacional de Carnes) in Uruguay.  These cattle 
prices were analyzed using data between January 1996 and June 2006. 
    
Information was also discovered during the interviews in Argentina and Uruguay 
suggesting that government policies and FMD outbreaks have likely affected cattle 
prices in the two countries.  Combining this information (cattle prices, government 
policy, and FMD outbreaks) into regression models using binary variables to depict 
government policies and FMD outbreaks provided an estimate of the absolute impact of 
these events on cattle prices.  The government policies considered most important by 
the interviewees included the unpegging of the Argentine peso to the US dollar 
(devaluation) in 2002, the levying of a major export tax on beef in Argentina, and the 
recent export moratorium imposed by the Argentine government on beef exports.  The 
interviews also uncovered when FMD outbreaks between 1996 and 2006 had occurred 
in Argentina which resulted in the interruption of beef exports from that country.  
Because Uruguay had no FMD outbreaks during this study time period, we measured 
what the effect of an FMD outbreak in Argentina would have on Uruguayan cattle 
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prices.  That is, if the much larger Argentine beef market was closed to export, one 
might expect this to have a positive impact on the beef market in Uruguay as importers 
substituted away from Argentine beef to Uruguayan beef. 
 
An analysis of the relative impacts of these events was also completed by examining 
price differences between local cattle prices in Argentina and Uruguay and the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) nearby live cattle futures price (sometimes referred to as 
the “world” cattle price).  This yielded a basis analysis for Argentina and Uruguay 
which described how government policies and FMD outbreaks in Argentina have 
affected Argentine and Uruguayan prices relative to the rest of the world.  This part of 
the analysis (relative prices) was important because it essentially revealed the 
opportunity costs associated with government policies and FMD outbreaks that 
restricted or disrupted beef exports during the study period.  The following equations 
were used to analyze cattle prices in Argentina, with similar equations used to analyze 
prices in Uruguay: 
 
(1)
jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
RES TAX NEWDES FMD
DEV MOR QT QT QT PRICE PRICE
ρ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + = −
10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 1 0 3 2 1
 
(2)
jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
RES TAX NEWDES FMD
DEV MOR QT QT QT BASIS BASIS
σ μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ μ μ
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + = −
10 9 8 7




The λs and μs in equations (1) and (2), respectively, were estimated parameters and ρ 
and σ  are error terms.  PRICEjt and BASISjt represent the real, exchange-rate adjusted 
cattle price in Argentina during time period t in US dollars for the jth livestock type 
(j=400-420 kg., 480+ kg. in Argentina and steers, cows in Uruguay) and the basis 
between the real, exchange-rate adjust cattle price in Argentina and the deflated CME 
price in time period t, respectively.  The variables PRICEjt-1   and BASIS jt-1 were lagged 
dependent variables for equation (1) and (2), respectively, and would be expected to 
have positive parameter estimates because current price levels should be positively 
related to price levels in the immediate past.  Prices for cattle weighing 400-420 kg. 
represented primarily animals going to the domestic market in Argentina while those 
weighing over 480 kg. were similar to cattle that would eventually be exported as meat.  
Steers and cows in Uruguay represent markets for muscle meat and hamburger, 
respectively. 
 
The three variables QT1, QT2, QT3 were quarterly dummy variables and were used to 
correct for seasonality in the dependent variables in Argentina and Uruguay.  The 
fourth quarter was used as the base.   Typically one would expect prices to be highest in 
the spring (QT3) compared to the summer (QT4) because of the seasonal availability of 
cattle.  MOR was a binary variable equal to one during the period of the export 
moratorium and zero otherwise.  MOR would be expected to have a negative parameter 
estimate because restricting exports should reduce domestic cattle prices.  At the time 
the personal interviews were conducted, a moratorium on beef exports had been in 
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place for four months and was thought by interviewees to be negatively affecting all 
parts of the cattle business in Argentina. 
   
DEV was a binary variable describing the impact on cattle prices and the basis 
resulting from the devaluation in Argentina’s currency in 2002.  This was when the 
Argentine government decided to unpeg the one-to-one ratio between the peso and the 
US dollar.  DEV was set equal to one following this devaluation and was zero otherwise.  
DEV would be expected to have a negative parameter estimate, especially for the basis 
equation, because after the devaluation domestic prices in Argentina should have 
declined relative to prices in the US. 
 
The binary variable for FMD was equal to one when the EU market was closed to 
Argentine beef exports as a result of an FMD outbreak in Argentina.  FMD was 
expected to have a negative parameter estimate for the Argentina model because a 
cessation in trade would be expected to result in lower domestic prices for exporters.  
However, FMD5 was expected to have a positive parameter estimate for the Uruguay 
model because a cessation of beef exports from Argentina would be expected to enhance 
the demand for Uruguayan beef.  In this respect, FMD in the Uruguay model becomes a 
proxy for the effect on Uruguayan prices of events in Argentina that either stopped or 
hindered Argentine beef exports. 
 
In 2005, Argentina tripled export taxes on domestic beef exporters.  TAX is a binary 
variable that estimates the effect this tax had on cattle prices.  TAX was equal to one 
during the period the tax was in force and zero otherwise.  TAX was expected to have a 
negative parameter estimate because an export tax is expected to reduce the amount of 
beef exported and, hence, domestic cattle prices.  NEWDES was a binary variable used 
to account for changes in reported weights at the Liniers market during the study 
period and had no a priori expectation relating to the sign of its parameter estimate.  
NEWDES was equal to one for cattle reported as weighing 430-460 kg. and zero for 
cattle reported as weighing 401-420 kg.  The final variable, RES, represented the 
residuals of the cattle price or basis time series off a linear trend line.  This captured 
the effects of systematic rises and falls in cattle prices in Argentina and Uruguay due to 
cattle cycles.  RES was expected to have a positive parameter estimate because prices 
above the trend line had a positive value for RES while prices below the trend line 
yielded a negative value for RES. 
 
Finally, Johansen’s (1991) cointegration tests were used to determine whether cattle 
prices in Argentina were cointegrated with US cattle prices. The analysis was then 
repeated for Uruguayan and US cattle prices. For a thorough discussion of 
cointegration methodology applied to agribusiness price analysis see Vickner and 
Davies (2000 and 2002). If the prices were cointegrated, it indicated that the prices in 
both pairs of markets adjust to the same information and that the markets are 
relatively efficient (if one considers the US cattle market price to be efficient). Efficient 
                                                             
5  Because Uruguay was FMD free during the study period, FMD in the Uruguay model examined the impact on 
Uruguayan prices of export cessations from Argentina resulting from FMD outbreaks. 
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markets are essential for one to have confidence that the market reacts appropriately 
and quickly to new information as it becomes available.  The existence of inefficient 
markets would be a very negative signal for FDI because investors could not be certain 
that prices would adjust to actual supply and demand conditions.  The vector error 
correction (VEC) model used to determine whether the Argentina or Uruguay price (P1) 




t t t t t
P P
P P P P P
1 1 2 1 1 1
2 2 12 1 2 11 2 1 12 1 1 11 10 1
) ( ε γ δ φ
β β α α α
+ − − +
Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ
− −




t t t t t
P P
P P P P P
2 1 2 1 1 2
2 2 22 1 2 21 2 1 22 1 1 21 20 2
) ( ε γ δ φ
β β α α α
+ − − +
Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ
− −
− − − −
 
 
where the unknown parameters will be estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 
It is easily observed that the VEC is simply a vector autoregressive (VAR) model with 
an additional term  1 2 1 1 − − − − t t P P γ δ   (i.e., the cointegrating  relationship). The VAR 
expresses changes in price at time t as a function of both own and related price changes 
in earlier time periods (t-1 and t-2 specifically).  The α  and β  parameters capture these 
effects in the VAR portion of the VEC. The cointegrating relationship  1 2 1 1 − − − − t t P P γ δ  
relates the level of prices, not changes in price levels, in the last period. Both δ  and γ  
are common across (3) and (4). The key parameter here is γ  since it characterizes the 
long-term relationship between the Argentine or Uruguayan cattle price (P1) and the 
US cattle price (P2). A priori we expect  0 < γ  since the two series move opposite one 
another when plotted. The remaining φ  parameters are the well-known speeds of 
adjustment. They characterize the length of time (P1) and (P2) take to get back into 
equilibrium in the short-run if the system experiences some kind of shock or 
disturbance to the long-run equilibrium path. 
 
The following section relates the results of the profit and price analyses.  The results 
indicate that profit potential exists for strategic FDI in the beef systems of these 
countries, but that this depends on the strategic business arrangements developed and 




General Overview of Potential Competitive Advantage 
 
The interviews suggested that both Argentina and Uruguay have a competitive 
advantage in producing cattle and beef, but both countries also face significant 
problems relating to expanding beef exports.  For example, both Argentina and 
Uruguay have strong domestic demand for beef as well as growing export markets.  
However, Argentina has a larger land and grain production base than Uruguay and, 
consequently, could support a cattle feeding industry more easily than Uruguay.  Both 
countries have specialized work forces and good infrastructures that support the beef 
industry.  While both countries have governments that are strongly committed to their 
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respective beef industries, Argentina often experiences governmental interference in its 
cattle and beef markets.  On the other hand, the government of Uruguay promotes 
transparent and export-oriented markets and marketing strategies.   
 
Both countries are well-engineered for producing beef.  However, Argentina’s beef 
market faces considerable risk resulting from the threat of FMD and also governmental 
policies which are not conducive for the international beef trade.  Uruguay has a strong 
commitment to the international beef trade, but lacks the land base and grain 
production to significantly increase its export base.  These conditions suggest that both 
countries have significant opportunities and barriers that could affect the growth in 
their beef export markets.  Consequently, investors need to consider institutional 
influences beyond just costs of production and transportation costs when examining the 
possibility for FDI in the beef industries of these two countries. 
 
Budgeting Analysis of Historical Profitability 
 
Based on average profitability reported in Margenes Agropecuarios Magazine (various 
1996-2006) between 1996 and 2006, cow/calf operations (mean $7.92/hectare and 
standard deviation $7.73/hectare) and grass fattening (mean $9.30/hectare standard 
deviation $24.06/hectare) have positive average returns while feedlots (mean -
$11.20/head and standard deviation $15.03/head) have negative average returns.  
Returns are obviously cyclic, as would be expected, because of the substantial biological 
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Figure 2:  Exchange Rate-Adjusted Profitability for Different Segments of the Cattle 
Marketing Chain in Argentina Reported in US Dollars, January 1995 – October 2006. 
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Returns for grass-based operations are consistently positive (75% of the months for 
grass fattening and 84% of the months for cow/calf operations).  Feedlot operations 
were profitable for only 17% of the months between 2000 and 2006.  However, 
profitability in feedlots has been consistently improving since 2002 (Figure 2).  These 
figures are also consistent with Silva’s (2003) point estimates for profitability at the 
different stages of production in the beef marketing chain in Argentina.  Because the 
data include a charge for land, the results are essentially an estimate of economic 
profit.  They also reflect statistically speaking that economic profits are basically zero 
or normal.  This suggests that markets are competitive at these three levels and as 
such may not represent significant opportunities for FDI as far a generating higher 
than normal profits. 
 
Although returns are statistically zero for all three of these levels of the marketing 
chain, a discussion of the cost structure of the cattle industry at each stage of the 
marketing chain may be instructive as far as understanding the relative variability in 
returns at the three different levels.  Cow/calf operations in these countries rely on few 
inputs other than land.  In this sense, the cow/calf sector is a “closed system” in this 
part of South America that buys few inputs on the market (purchased inputs include 
sanitary products, labor, professional services, and tax services). Short-run exogenous 
shocks have limited direct effect on profit due to the long production cycle (15-16 
months for calves and 33-35 months for cows). 
 
Profits in grass fattening operations depend heavily on the purchase price for calves 
being placed on grass for fattening.  For example, according to Silva (2003) if the ratio 
of calf price and steer prices exceeds 1.20, profit tends to be negative (the average ratio 
was 1.07 between 1990 and 2000). The price of calves represents about 61% of total cost 
for grass fattening operations, according to information reported in Márgenes 
Agropecuarios Magazine (2006). 
  
Feedlots are more “open” systems than cow/calf or grass fattening operations and their 
profits are heavily influenced by short-run exogenous shocks due to the relatively short 
production cycle for feedlots (113 days/cycle on the average).  Examples of potential 
exogenous shocks include such things as the prices of feeder cattle, grains, energy, and 
finished cattle. Short-run prices, of course, are also influenced by government policies 
and animal disease outbreaks.  Pearcey (1999) suggests that feedlots in Argentina and 
elsewhere have high fixed costs due to investments in machinery and equipment.  
Consequently, capacity utilization is an important driver of profitability for feedlots. 
    
Grass feeding cattle is the most efficient method of rearing cattle in Argentina, both in 
energy and economic terms (Silva, 2003), so it is not surprising that the results indicate 
that positive profits usually exist for the cow/calf and grass fattening segments, and 
negative profits for the feedlots.6 If one accounts for the increase of energy prices by the 
                                                             
6 It should be noted that there were only 88 point estimates for feedlots and 142 for cow/calf and grass fattening segments. 
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previous Argentine administration (2002) and present administration (2003)7, the 
profit figures depicted in Figure 2 can be easily explained.  Most grass fattening 
operations are diversified meaning that they are also cropping operations where cattle 
are considered a low-risk sideline investment but not the primary source of income for 
the operation (Silva, 2006).  
 
Conditions in the meat packing and exporting industries were also considered.  The 
overall four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) for meat packing in Argentina is only 9% 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 248 (Silva, 2003).  This compares to the 
CR4 in the US of 80% (Barkema, Drabenstott, and Novack, 2001) and for Australia of 
29% (CICCRA, 2004). The US Department of Justice estimated a HHI for the US 
of1936 (Barkema, Drabenstott, and Novack, 2001).  The Hilton Quota market in 
Argentina has a CR48 of 40% and a HHI of 653, showing greater concentration in 
exporting than in meat packing.  Low concentration in meat packing suggests a 
relatively competitive market at that level.  Exporting appears to be a less competitive 
market than meat packing.  However, exporting plants have been systematically 
increasing their profit margins, due to extraordinarily high prices in the international 
market.  The signals revealing that exporting firms expect to achieve important profits 
are the acquisition of local exporting firms by transnational corporations such as 
Cargill (US), Friboi (Brazil) and Tesco (UK) (Silva, 2006). 
 
A point estimate of profitability in the packing industry for domestic and exported beef 
is provided in Table 1.9  Silva (2006) believes that this point estimate is fairly 
representative of typical conditions in the packing industry in Argentina.  The results 
presented in Table 1 indicate that the packing industry in Argentina is profitable.  
However, the results also indicate that exported beef has a higher profit margin than 
domestic beef.  The reason for this is the value of the Hilton Quota in exporting to the 
EU.    
 
The growth in beef imports expected in the EU might lead one to speculate that over 
time there will be increased incentives offered by the EU to beef importers.  If so, then 
meat packing for export would appear to be an increasingly attractive investment over 
time.  The results related to meat packing, qualified by the fact that they are based on a 
point estimate, support the notion that FDI will be drawn to the packing and export 
sectors.  This conclusion would appear to be supported by the recent investments in 
beef exporting in Argentina by transnational companies. 
 
Uruguay lacks the large amount of agricultural land existing in Argentina and is also 
energy dependent on imports.  Consequently, Uruguay is committed to beef cattle 
production and forestry because exports industries are viewed as the main drivers for 
national development in Uruguay.  The most important barrier to further FDI in  
                                                             
7 The prices of energy have been heavily regulated in Argentina since the devaluation in 2002. 
8 CR4 and HHI as reported here were estimated in March 2007 using export quantities for the Hilton Quota in 2003. 
9  The results presented in this study are valid for the time period considered and for conditions during the period for when 
point estimates were made.  Additional research that incorporated a time series for export and domestic packing industries 
would be appropriate in another study. 
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 Table 1:  Point Estimate of Relative Mark1eting Margins for Domestic and Exported 
Meat FOB Packing Plant, Argentina. 
Calculation of Export Carcass Cut-Out Value:1 
Carcass 
Weight (kg.) 
Primal Cut  %  Weight (kg.)  Beef Yield (kg.)  By Products Fat  
& Bone (kg.) 
Price2 
(US $/kg.) 
Pecho (Chest)  36  100  68  32  $2.32 
Parrillero 
(Grill) 
14 38.92  35  3.92  $2.32 
Rump & Loin  21  58.38  35.71  22.67  $7.97 
Rueda 26  72.28 49.71  22.57  $2.32 









Relative Marketing Margin for Export Meat Packing Plants As of April 6, 2007 (RMM):3 
Live Price for 480 kg. Steer    $1 US/kg 
Export Packer Price FOB4   $3.38  US/kg 
R M M       7 0 %  
Relative Marketing Margin for Domestic Consumption RMM3 
Live Price for 420 kg. Steer    $1 US/kg 
Meat Packer Wholesale Price5    $1,72 US $/kg.  (Sold on a carcass basis) 
R M M       4 2 %  
Retailer Price6     $2.60  US  $/kg  (deboned  carcass  basis) 
R M M       3 4 %  
 
1 Technical information for calculating weights for cuts taken from Iriarte (2003). 
2  Includes just the revenue from beef, not from by products. 
3 RMM= (Sales Price – Purchase Price)/Sales Price  [Relative Marketing Margin].  Export Prices for EU Hilton 
Quota: $7,970 $/MT and other fresh cuts 2,320 $/MT 
4  The slaughter service (toll) is paid from the revenue from by products sold by the meat packing plant. The user of the 
service receives the carcass cut in halves with no cash costs beyond this. 
5 Average price for a kg. of beef in the carcass with an average yield of 58% from live weight. 
6 Average price for a kg. of beef sold over the counter with an average yield of 81.88 % from carcass weight. 
 
 
Uruguay is the limited cattle herd and unavailability of additional land for cattle 
production.  In the future there may be increasing cooperation between Uruguay and 
Argentina such as expanding the packing industry in Uruguay and slaughtering an 
increasing number of cattle from Argentina.  Grain costs are lower in Argentina thanin 
Uruguay, due to its relative abundance of land and infrastructure. Uruguay is closer to 
Buenos Aires or Rosario than many of the major cattle producing provinces in western, 
southern and northern Argentina (Silva, 2006).  These factors would seem to indicate 
that incentives exist for Argentina and Uruguay to establish cooperation in developing 
cattle markets. 
 
Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Government Interventions and FMD Outbreaks 
 
The price analysis results are presented in Tables 2-5.  The signs for the parameter 
estimates were those expected for almost all of the independent variables.  The 
discussion in this section will focus on the variables of most interest (i.e., government 
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intervention and FMD).  The analysis revealed that the impact of government policies 
and FMD outbreaks can have a substantial negative impact on absolute cattle prices in 
Argentina, but that the impact is even larger on relative prices as measured by the 
basis (see parameter estimates for MOR, FMD, DEV, and TAX in Tables 2 and 3). 
   
 










INTERCEPT   8.965**  2.003  0.984  INTERCEPT  9.455** 1.978  0.981 
PRICEt-1  0.827**  0.042    PRICEt-1 0.801** 0.043   
Q1   0.065  0.441    Q1  0.317 0.433   
Q2  -0.101 0.442   Q2  0.134 0.436   
Q3  -0.367 0.440   Q3  -0.033 0.436   
MOR  -0.828 1.496   MOR  -0.897 1.475   
DEV  -1.198 0.854   DEV  -1.278 0.790   
FMD  -2.952** 0.728    FMD  -3.026** 0.686   
NEWDES  -0.871 1.321   NEWDES  -0.953 1.304   
TAX  -1.585** 0.709    TAX  -1.777** 0.688   
RES   0.252**  0.050     RES  0.291** 0.051     
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 










INTERCEPT  -6.046** 1.356  0.970  INTERCEPT  -8.087** 1.406  0.968 
BASISt-1  0.608**  0.048    BASISt-1  0.575**  0.048   
Q1   0.847  0.719    Q1   1.017  0.694   
Q2   0.461  0.742    Q2   0.499  0.722   
Q3  -0.431 0.739   Q3  -0.530 0.723   
MOR  -1.436 2.480   MOR  -1.598 2.395   
DEV  -3.797** 1.270    DEV  -3.930** 1.161   
FMD  -7.018** 1.101    FMD  -6.942** 1.019   
NEWDES  -1.146 2.163   NEWDES  -1.547 2.092   
TAX  -4.743** 1.146    TAX  -4.902** 1.090   
RES   0.533**  0.062     RES   0.601**  0.061    
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 










INTERCEPT  -1.218** 0.583  0.984  INTERCEPT  -0.900 0.477 0.985 
PRICEt-1  0.970**  0.014    PRICEt-1  0.973**  0.014   
Q1   1.573**  0.418    Q1   0.909**  0.336   
Q2   1.293**  0.414    Q2   0.832**  0.336   
Q3   2.222**  0.426    Q3   1.970**  0.338   
FMD   0.735  0.374    FMD   0.576  0.298   
RES   0.110**  0.037     RES   0.096**  0.035    
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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INTERCEPT   -4.952** 1.328  0.951  INTERCEPT  -5.518** 1.519  0.938 
BASISt-1  0.935**  0.024    BASISt-1  0.919**  0.028   
Q1   1.943**  0.922    Q1   1.348  0.888   
Q2   2.063**  0.921    Q2   1.707  0.881   
Q3   1.183  0.966    Q3   1.015  0.915   
FMD   0.988  0.810    FMD   0.853  0.772   
RES   0.245**  0.063     RES   0.267**  0.065    
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
For example, the average real, exchange-rate adjusted price for 480+ kg. cattle at the 
Liniers auction during the study period was approximately $33/cwt. ( $0.73/kg.).  The 
average impact of a FMD outbreak on domestic (relative) prices was -$3.03/cwt.  
(-$6.94/cwt.), all other things being equal (Tables 2 and 3).  This suggests a loss of 9% 
(21%) in the value of domestic live cattle that were sold during an FMD outbreak.  This 
would be in addition to losses in the export market.  For example, in 2006 Argentina 
exported approximately 500,000 MT of beef.  The cessation of exports, if an FMD 
outbreak had been experienced during the entirety of 2006, would have been foregone 
income from exports of almost $1.7 billion ($3.38/kg.10 * 1000 kg. * 500,000 MT).  This 
would be in addition to losses experienced on live cattle sold domestically during that 
same time period.  Consequently, the combined losses from cattle sales and lost exports 
would be much higher.11  There are obviously huge incentives to avoid FMD outbreaks 
and this explains why so much effort has been made to eliminate FMD in Argentina 
and Uruguay.  
    
A similar analysis could be conducted for the export tax (TAX).  Based on the parameter 
estimate in Table 3, TAX  would have resulted during the taxation period in reducing 
values for domestic cattle in Argentina relative to the rest of the world by 
approximately $23.52/head ($4.90/cwt. * 4.8 cwt.).  The Argentine devaluation in 2002, 
while likely being an appropriate government policy, resulted in a drop in the relative 
price of cattle in Argentina of approximately $18.86/head ($3.93/cwt.12 * 4.8 cwt.).   The 
result of DEV was to make Argentine beef cheaper on world markets and exports from 
Argentina did increase after 2002 (Figure 2).  The result of the devaluation was a 
stimulation of beef exports.  This appears to run counter to government policies in 
Argentina that are often designed to eliminate or reduce beef exports as a method to 
keep domestic beef prices low.  Consequently, subsequent government policies such as 
TAX and MOR may have been an attempt to counter the effects of the devaluation.  
 
Government actions designed to keep beef prices low eliminated or significantly 
reduced the ability of exporters to participate in world trade when world prices were 
                                                             
10  See Table 1 for explanation of export value (i.e., $3.38/kg.).   
11  The cattle inventory of Argentina is over 50 million head (USDA, ERS, 1998b).  If only 20% of these went to market 
each year, this could result in a potential loss of another $145 million ($3.03/cwt. * 4.8 cwt. * 10 million head.) 
12  See Table 3. 
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relatively high (i.e., the basis with world prices becomes weaker when world prices 
increase).  Consequently, government involvement represents a significant risk to FDI 
in beef systems, especially in Argentina.  This is much less of a problem in Uruguay 
were government policy is designed to promote beef exports.  The effect of MOR in 
Argentina was negative but not statistically significant (Tables 2 and 3).  The reason for 
this may be that the moratorium had been in place for only four months at the time the 
analysis was completed and this may have been an insufficient amount of time to 
establish the impact of MOR statistically. 
 
No governmental policy variables were included in the models for Uruguay because the 
Uruguayan government had not implemented such policies during the study period (see 
Tables 3 and 4).  However, FMD was included in the Uruguayan models essentially as a 
proxy for events in Argentina affecting Argentine beef exports and which might then 
have affected the Uruguayan cattle market indirectly.  The parameter estimates for 
FMD in Tables 3 and 4 are positive as expected, but are not statistically significant.   
This would suggest that there is not strong statistical evidence that a cessation or 
reduction of beef exports from Argentina effects cattle prices in Uruguay.  The reasons 
for this are likely the relatively small size of the Uruguayan market compared to 
Argentina and the fact that Uruguay faces significant barriers to increasing exports 
substantially in the short run. 
   
There was not a statistically significant seasonal component to either prices or basis for 
Argentina (Q1, Q2, and Q3 in Tables 2 and 3), but seasonality was indicated for steers 
in Uruguay, but not for cows (Tables 4 and 5).  This should not be surprising because 
the price of cows is likely less influenced by world prices than the price of steers (steer 
meat would be more frequently traded in world markets).  Cattle cycles had a strong 
influence on both prices and the basis in both countries (see RES in Tables 2-5).  That 
is, when domestic cattle numbers are relatively low (high) prices tend to be higher 
(lower) resulting in an improving (weakening) basis with world prices.  
 
These results indicate that a significant amount of risk is present in the cattle market 
in Argentina as a result of government policies and FMD outbreaks.13  This analysis 
provides estimates of the negative impacts caused by these events.  The impacts are of 
sufficient magnitude that investors should consider the probability of such events 




In Table 6, we found the Argentina price to be cointegrated with the US price, and the 
Uruguay price to be cointegrated with the US price.14  This is a robust result as  
 
 
                                                             
13  The results are, of course, qualified by the time period of the analysis (1996-2006), but should represent a long enough 
period to present a fairly accurate picture of the impact of government interventions and animal disease outbreaks. 
14 Due to page limitations, full model results, including parameter estimates in each VEC model and results from the 
battery of ADF tests and related specification tests, are available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 6:  Johansen Cointegration Test Results for Argentina and Uruguay. 
 









Trace        
     r = 0  28.2357  15.4947  0.0004  0.2381 
     r ≤ 1    1.0359    3.8414  0.3088  0.0103 
Max-Eigen        
     r = 0  27.1998  14.2646  0.0003  0.2381 
     r ≤ 1    1.0359    3.8414  0.3088  0.0103 
 









Trace        
     r = 0  27.5846  15.4947  0.0005  0.2305 
     r ≤ 1    1.3732    3.8414  0.2412  0.0136 
Max-Eigen        
     r = 0  26.2113  14.2646  0.0004  0.2305 
     r ≤ 1    1.3732    3.8414  0.2412  0.0136 
 









Trace        
     r = 0  29.2838  15.4647  0.0002  0.2429 
     r ≤ 1    1.4495  3.8414  0.2286  0.0143 
Max-Eigen        
     r = 0  27.8343  14.2646  0.0002  0.2429 
     r ≤ 1    1.4495    3.8414  0.2286  0.0143 
 









Trace        
     r = 0  27.8883  15.4947  0.0004  0.2346 
     r ≤ 1    1.1445    3.8414  0.2847  0.0113 
Max-Eigen        
     r = 0  26.7437  14.2646  0.0003  0.2346 
     r ≤ 1    1.1445    3.8414  0.2847  0.0113 
 
 
it persists using both the trace and eigenvalue likelihood ratio tests for each respective 
pair of price series. In each case, we rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
vector. That is to say under the null hypothesis r = 0, where r is the number of 
cointegrating vectors in the system, we strongly reject this hypothesis. It is noted r can 
be at most one minus the number of price series in the model. In this study, then r can 
be at most one. For this test, we failed to reject the null hypothesis of at most one 
cointegrating vector (r ≤ 1), again in each case. Thus, each pair of prices was 
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cointegrated indicating that the time series are reacting to the same market 
information and are therefore essentially the same efficient market.  Further, these 
price series are negatively cointegrated ( 0 < γ ) as expected a priori.  This implies that 
the series tend to react to the same market information but move in opposite directions.   
 
For example, if market conditions tend to move the world price higher, local prices tend 
to move lower. This pattern is visually evident when plotting the respective pairs of 
prices (Figure 3). This could be explained by government interventions designed to keep 
local prices low when world prices increase.  This result suggests that government 
policies of the past have provided at least some disincentive to invest in beef exporting 
from Argentina because exporters are unable to fully participate in world markets 





























































Figure 3:  Real, Exchange-Rate Adjusted Cattle Prices in the United States, Argentina, 
and Uruguay, 1996-2006. 
 
This result suggests that governmental policy needs to align with corporate objectives 
to encourage FDI in the beef industry in South America.  This does not necessarily 
mean that exporting from these countries is unprofitable because  
apparently it is a profitable venture as the profitability analysis, especially for meat 
packing provided above, demonstrates. However, profits appear to be limited from time 
to time by different governmental actions and FMD outbreaks. 
 




The expected growth in beef imports in the EU and the fact that North American beef 
exports are essentially shut out of the EU market provides significant incentives for 
finding alternative ways for exporting beef to the EU.  This research examines the 
profit potential for FDI in the beef systems of Argentina and Uruguay by investors from 
places like North America so that they can become involved in exporting beef to the EU.  
Interviews with industry experts in Argentina and Uruguay established the foundation 
for this analysis and resulted in the selection of historical budgeting and econometric 
models being used as the basis for examining this question.   
 
The findings suggest that while Argentina and Uruguay have a competitive advantage 
in beef production that should provide incentives for FDI in their beef systems, the 
potential for government policy interventions in cattle and beef markets (especially in 
Argentina) and FMD outbreaks inject considerable risk into these investments.  FDI 
opportunities appear to be primarily at the export packer level rather than in raising 
cattle.  Joint ventures by export packers and feedlots (i.e., Tyson, Cactus Feeders, and 
Cresud) and the expansion of the number of feedlots in Argentina suggest FDI 
strategies involving export packers are being positioned to enhance the quality of meat 
being both exported and sold domestically.  Entrée to the export market appears to be a 
critical element of the FDI decision in Argentina and Uruguay and explains the current 
joint venture and FDI strategies being pursued by international firms investing in the 
beef systems of these two countries. 
 
Cattle markets in Argentina and Uruguay appear to operate efficiently, based on the 
cointegration analysis, but government intervention that restricts or eliminates beef 
exports results in lower domestic cattle prices than if beef exports were allowed to flow 
in an unrestricted fashion.  Profitable FDI appears possible, especially in beef 
exporting, if markets are left unhindered by government intervention.   
During the next decade, beef exporters can hardly ignore the export potential that 
exists into the EU.  Restrictions on beef exports with added hormones coupled with 
additional requirements such as traceability make South America and specifically 
Argentina and Uruguay apparent targets for FDI by beef exporters.  Some investment 
is occurring and is almost certainly being driven by the opportunities looming in the 
EU.  However, the growth in FDI for beef exporting from Argentina and Uruguay is 
still relatively small but will likely continue to grow.  However, this growth will 
probably occur more slowly than one might otherwise expect because of limitations 
inflicted on the beef export market by government policies in Argentina and limited 
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